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 The paper analyzes the way in which political parties in Croatia are financed. 
Particular attention is paid to the campaign finance during the 2003 parliamentary 
elections. It is suggested that ts the main obstacle in regulating political finance in 
Croatia is the non-existence of any kind of disclosure obligation for regular and 
campaign funds of political parties. The paper particularly carefully analyzes the 
structure of the Croatian political parties’ budgets. There are two basic findings of 
the analysis: Croatian political parties rely too heavily on state subsidies, while 
donations from the business sector are completely non-transparent and without 
any limitations. 
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1. Croatian system of financing political parties and elections in com-
parative public finance literature 
 Conducting democratic elections regularly includes a mixture of measures regulat-
ing the issues of political finance. There are no general rules how to deal with party and 
campaign funding or what could be labeled as the best practice in handling political fi-
nance. But nevertheless some standards of good practice could be very clearly elabo-
rated. “A system of public financing, full disclosure and an enforcing agency backed by 
legal sanctions are essential to the success of a reform for party finance” (Nassmacher, 
2003). So the essential point we could raise here is the question: how does the Croatian 
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system of financing parties and elections match the previously mentioned standards.1 In 
answering that question we are going to pay particular attention to the behavior of po-
litical parties in financing their 2003 parliamentary election campaigns. 
 The Croatian system of campaign finance is not unknown to international scholars 
dealing with political finance.2 One of the leading authors in the field, Michael Pinto-
Duschinsky mentioned, for example, one peculiarity of the Croatian campaign finance 
as an item in his list of scandals related to political finance. He indicated that “after the 
Croatian Democratic Union fell from power in 2000, it came out that the party had 
raised most of its funding through 'racketeering' schemes in which government con-
tractors would be paid only in return for substantial contributions to party coffers” 
(Pinto-Duschinsky, 2002: 73). 
 Putting aside the above mentioned malpractice, the question remains: what are the 
basic features of the Croatian system of funding parties and elections. Taking into ac-
count the common political finance measures we can offer several basic conclusions: 
1. The Croatian system of funding parties and elections does not apply any disclosure 
laws 
2. The regulatory policies containing bans and limits on party and election campaign 
finance are nonexistant 
3. Croatian political parties heavily rely on government subsidies in funding their regu-
lar and campaign activities 
4. The system shows general intrasparency of funding from private sources 
5. Membership fees generally play an infinitesimal role in party budgets. 
 
2. Regulating Croatian party and campaign finance 
 The Croatian political finance system is a typical case of the “thinly regulated” area. 
The whole regulation of party funding is contained in a couple of general articles pro-
vided by the section III of the Law on Parties enacted in 1993. The only concrete provi-
sion can be found in the article 19 which regulates the manner in which state subsidies 
to parliamentary political parties are calculated. In other articles there are no provisions 
regarding the basic nuts and bolts for regulating party and campaign finance, such as the 
bans and limits to particular types of revenues and expenditures, the ways of disclosure 
and reporting on public money, the public agencies for conducting the overall control 
and, finally, the breaches and penalties which could be implemented in case of non-
statutory activities. 
 Due to that fact Croatia has been valed in the comparative political finance literature 
as a country without any disclosure laws (Pinto-Duschinsky, 2002: 76-77). The non-ex-
 
1 First comparative studies on political finance conducted by Croatian scholars showed that the system 
hardly matches any standards established in developed countries (Petak, 2001). 
2 See for example: Toplak (2003), Ikstens et al. (2002). 
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istence of disclosure laws is not in itself a sign of a non-democratic practice in funding 
elections3; however, in an overwhelming majority of cases it means exactly such a type 
of practice. 
  
3. The structure of party budgets 
 In performing their regular and campaign activities, Croatian political parties heav-
ily rely on state subsidies. The importance of public funding is clearly shown in Table 1, 
which indicates the share of particular revenues and expenditures in party budgets. Pub-
lic financing represents more than 75 percent of total revenues. Due to this, state is the 
major donor in financing Croatian political parties and, consequently, politics.  
 
Table 1: Public funding in total revenues of political parties 












United States 3 
United Kingdom 2 
    Source: Pinto-Duschinsky (2002) 
 
4. Non-transparency of funding from business companies  
 One of the peculiarities of the Croatian system of political finance is a completely 
unclear picture of the business sector’s contributions to political parties’ budgets. The 
donations from the businesses have to be hidden under the item “other sources”, but due 
 
3 Sweden is a very good example of a country with a democratic practice in political finance without the 
enacted disclosure laws. In that country there was a long debate whether or not the parties should be obliged 
to disclose their financial data. The starting point in the discussion was the statement that political parties 
represent private associations of civil society. Consenquently, they are not obliged to disclose their financial 
reports. “The whole question was finally resolved when, in 1980, all five parties represented in the parliament 
concluded a ‘voluntary agreement’ for the annual mutual exchange of their balances on income and 
expenditure and to make their balances avalilable to others upon request.” (Nassmacher, 2003: 10). 
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to the lack of any clear accounting standards they are sometimes expressed as “contri-
butions” or “transfers”. Different figures that have been disclosed on this source of 
funding by the two leading political parties confirm the existence of the problem. The 
Social Democratic Party (SDP) disclosed 4.6 million of kunas received in 2003 from the 
business sector and did not report any item under the label “contributions”. At the same 
time the Croatian Democratic Union disclosed just 1 million of kunas under the item 
“other sources” and 7.8 million of kunas under the item “contributions”. Since the HDZ, 
according to some reliable findings (Appelt, 2003b), received at least 6 million kunas, 
that means that the two political parties applied a different standard of reporting on the 
funds coming from the business sector.  
 
Table 2: Structure of revenues of political parties in Croatia in 2003 
 HDZ SDP HSP HNS HSS IDS LS DC 
Public funds 18,376 30,626 2,382 1,552  8,631 4,388 2,224 2,171 
Contributions  7,801 - - - - - - - 
Membership fees  201  1,559 1 512  203  38  95 23 
Transfers - - - - - - - 99 
Economic activities  1,066 - - - - - - - 
Other sources  1,039  4,682  326 415  3,578  146  88 1,114 
Total 28,485 36,868 2,710 2,481 12,485 4,574 2,408 4,132 
 Source: Appelt (2003a) 
 
  Apart from the dubious accounting standards that have been applied in financial re-
porting, even more problematic is the non-existence of any disclosure obligations of 
political parties in terms of money received from the business sector. There are no dis-
closures of the amounts nor the disclosures of the threshold which could limit and make 
more transparent the funds coming from Croatian companies. Additionally, there strong 
indications that many donations have not been registered at all, meaning that the bulk of 
the corporative money ended up in the political parties’ coffers in the form of cash.4  
 The lack of clear reporting standards as well as the non-existence of disclosure 
obligation highly contribute to the non-transparency of the funds coming from the busi-
ness sector. It also increases the possibility of corruption of all kinds. The financial sup-
porters of political parties from the business sector may require a favor in return for 
their funds: securing informal influence on governmental decisions.5 
 
 
4 There have been dozens of scandals which revealed that Croatian political parties regularly receive a lot 
of their funds as cash contributions from companies. It is a well-known story of the “money in bags”, which 
Croatian newspapers have regularly reported about. 
5 On corruptive potentials of party finance see comparative analysis edited by Robert Williams (Williams, 
2000). 
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5. Party budgets in non-election vs election years 
 Table 3 gives the data on the total revenues of the leading Croatian political parties 
in the period following the 2000 parliamentary elections.6 The figures clearly show a 
sharp increase in the revenues during the election year. The revenues of Croatian politi-
cal parties increased twofold on the average during the election year, indicating the role 
which campaign finance plays in the whole field of political finance. In some cases, 
such as that of the Croatian Peasant Party (HSS), the Democratic Center (DC) or the 
newly formed Liberal Democrats (Libra), the revenues in the election year increased 
more than twofold.  
  
Table 3: Revenues of Croatian political parties (in thousand kunas) 
 2000 2001 2002 2003 
HDZ  9,634 10,020 12,488 28,485 
SDP 11,889 17,617 17,929 36,868 
HSP n.a.  n.a.  874  2,710 
HNS n.a.  1,216  965  2,481 
HSS  3,078  3,006  3,627 12,485 
IDS  2,854  3,532  2,778  4,574 
HSLS  4,598  3,353 n.a. n.a. 
LS  1,550  869  1,155  2,408 
DC  831  2,035  1,510  4,132 
Libra – –  365  5,552 
Source: Appelt (2003a) 
 
 The main source of the increased funds required for campaigns were the donations 
from the central government budget. From 2002 to 2003 state subsidies increased from 
36 to over 70 million kunas. This shows, on the one hand, how important public funds 
are for financing Croatian political parties. At the same time, these “mushrooming” 
public funds were not enough for covering the ever-increasing campaign costs. The 
funds from “other sources” increased rapidly as well, from 4.1 million to 11.3 million 
kunas and if we add the amount hidden under the item of “contributions” in the case of 
the HDZ, the whole sum increased from 11.6 million to 29.6 million kunas.  
 
6. Basic features of campaign finance in 2003 parliamentary elections 
 Table 4 gives the data on the expenditures of political parties. The most important 
item is located in the second row, under the title “services”. That item represents the 
most important item in the expenditure side of the political parties’ budgets. Since all 
 
6 The data for some parties, particularly for the HSLS, are incomplete.  
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other costs only slightly changed, the increase in the costs of services clearly shows the 
basic costs of running campaign. The increase in that type of costs is higher than the ex-
penditures on all other items taken together.  
 
Table 4: Expenditures of political parties in 2003 
 HDZ SDP HSP HNS HSS IDS LS DC 
1. Material ex-
penditures 17,549 26,448 2,520 3,991  9,753 2,324 1,786 3,356 
 1.1. Services 16,555 23,326 2,103 3,251  8,928 2,113 1,728 3,240 
 1.2. Increase 
 in  services to 
 2002 
14,850 17,235 1,668 2,847 7,595 1,618 1,391 2,672 
2. Salaries   4,305  2,792 -  338  1,245 1,051  213  265 
3. Non-material 
expenditures  2,917  3,006  248  189  183  325  157  364 
4. Transfers  1,722 -  51  9  480 -  100  39 
5. Investments  1,619  1,614  96  9 - -  22  21 
6. Other expen-
ditures  301  1,135  20  106  104  143  18  83 
Total 26,796 34,547 2,520 4,642 11,767 3,844 2,299 4,135 
Source: Appelt (2003a) 
 
Conclusion 
 The Croatian system of political finance is definitely a system with a high level of 
non-transparency in funding political parties and campaigns. There are no obligations 
for the political parties to disclose their revenues and expenditures. But it has to be 
pointed out that the transparency of financial operations may not be enough. If we as-
sume that Croatian voters are not particularly keen to know much about the campaign 
finance, there is a need to include additional institutional arrangements which will rec-
ognize that fact. Public authorities must in such a case create a public agency which 
could be able to monitor and check on the flow of political finance (Nassmacher, 2003: 
12). 
 The second problem of the Croatian system of financing parties and campaigns is re-
lated to its heavy reliance on public funds, the funds coming as subsidies from the cen-
tral government budget, as well as from the regional and local budgets when local elec-
tions are at stake. There are, however, several unintended consequences when political 
finance system so heavily relies on public funds. The independence of parties may be 
undermined, the opposition parties may find themselves at a disadvantage in relation to 
the ruling parties and the state subsidies are extremely unpopular among the citizens 
(Nassmacher, 2003: 8). So openness to various sources of fund-raising should be a very 
important criterion for handling political finance in a country. Thus, a much too high 
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level of public funding – exactly Croatia’s case – could be for that reason an obstacle 
for developing an optimal system of financing parties and elections.7 
 Finally, the Croatian political finance system does not only require a strong obliga-
tion for public disclosure and clear standards for making accounting reports; an ex-
tremely important element of the regulation should be the establishment of the limits for 
particular funding sources (companies, individuals). Another important element is the 
establishment of the bans against certain kinds of financial contributions, which may be 
applied without any difficulties. Only when all these elements are comprised within a 
unified institutional system will it be possible to say that we have established a democ-
ratic control of political parties and campaign finance flows. 
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